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Abstract
This special section endeavors to facilitate the integration of biologically-based assessments of 
emotion into the clinical setting. This goal is consistent with the Research Domain Criteria 
(RDoC) initiative, which aims to identify transdiagnostic biobehavioral mechanisms that underlie 
mental disorders. We focus on four challenges to applying biologically-informed research on 
emotion and emotion regulation to clinical contexts: (1) How do we assess emotion in an RDoC 
framework? (2) How do we integrate measures of emotion with other systems in a wider context? 
(3) What do physiological indices of emotion tell us about clinical phenomena? and (4) How do 
we integrate physiological assessments into clinical practice? Throughout this comment, we refer 
to the articles in this special section to make our points, and, when possible, offer suggestions for 
future work to continue to address these challenges.
Overview
The goal of this special section is to advance the integration of biologically-based 
assessments of emotion into clinical assessment, diagnosis, and treatment. This is an 
important goal for several reasons. First, such an initiative can help to narrow the now wide 
gap between basic affective science and clinical practice. Despite the proliferation of 
emotion research in the last decade, what we know from laboratory work on emotional 
reactivity and regulation is still only infrequently directly applied to clinical assessment or 
treatment settings. The goal of this special section is also germane to the Research Domain 
Criteria (RDoC) initiative, which aspires to identify transdiagnostic biobehavioral 
mechanisms associated with psychopathology (Sanislow, Pine, Quinn, Kozak & Garvey, 
2010). Indeed, aspects of emotion reactivity and emotion regulation fit well into the RDoC 
initiative, and there is growing evidence of transdiagnostic emotion processes that can be 
measured using multiple units of analysis (including via physiology). For example, the 
LeMoult, Yoon & Joormann article (this issue) examines physiological indices of worry and 
rumination, which are relevant to multiple forms of psychopathology, including mood and 
anxiety disorders.
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We laud these goals and the special section for calling attention to them. The empirical 
contributions in this issue highlight the clear progress that is being made towards these lofty 
goals. At the same time, the special section and the articles in it have provoked us to reflect, 
and to identify several major challenges in realizing these goals. Some of these challenges 
have been described elsewhere (Lilenfield, 2014). In this comment, we focus on four 
challenges to applying biologically-informed research on emotion and emotion regulation to 
clinical contexts. Where possible, we offer suggestions for how to begin addressing these 
challenges.
Challenge 1: How do we assess emotion in an RDoC framework?
Clinicians and researchers who work with emotion have long been mindful of the problem 
that emotion is a multi-headed beast (Levenson, 2003). When we say that someone is afraid, 
we can confirm with many types of data: self-reports of anxiety, sweaty palms, wide eyes, 
racing hearts, frozen posture, a strong urge to flee or avoid a danger, scanning the 
environment for threat. While RDoC focuses on multiple units of analysis, biological 
measures are given the most emphasis. There is a particular focus on neural measures, as 
mental disorders are characterized primarily as dysfunctions in brain circuitry, with the 
ultimate goal to develop treatments targeting specific brain regions (Sanislow et al, 2010). 
Although this might make sense from some perspectives, the idea that biology is pre-
eminent is in tension with basic research in affective science, which has long viewed 
emotions (and, by extension, dysregulation of emotions) as multi-system phenomena (Lang, 
1988; Levenson, 2003; Mauss & Robinson, 2009). Indeed, part of what makes affective 
science challenging is that there are a large number of reasonably valid indicators of 
emotion, from self-report of experience, to facial behavior, to a variety of physiological 
indices of central and peripheral nervous system activity.
A first problem in taming the multi-headed beast of emotion is that correlations between 
these different systems of emotion response are only modest (e.g., Mauss et al., 2005). 
Remarkably, modest intercorrelations are found even when we examine measures that are 
putatively within the same system, such as autonomic nervous system activity. There remain 
debates within affective science concerning why the correspondence between different 
indicators is so low and inconsistent (Barrett, 2012). Thus, it may be insufficient to measure 
only a single response or response system. If clinicians respond by measuring multiple 
responses or systems, affective science cannot yet provide strong guidance concerning how 
to integrate what is often discrepant information across systems. Findings such as these fed 
worries about the very scientific validity of the construct of emotion (Barrett, 2012; 2006). 
At a minimum, the phenomenon of modest intercorrelations among emotion indicators casts 
doubt on the idea that we could ever safely take a part of emotion (biology) for the whole.
Apart from this issue of the part-whole relationship (see Barrett 2009 for further discussion), 
the field has not come to consensus on what are the biological indicators of emotion (despite 
many promising leads). For example, meta-analytic studies have shown that several brain 
areas are sensitive to emotion (e.g., amygdala, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), but no brain 
areas have been linked invariably to specific discrete emotions (Lindquist et al., 2012). 
Similarly, while studies of the autonomic nervous system have been successful at measuring 
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components of emotion, such as arousal (Lang, 1988), these measures have shown only a 
limited ability to distinguish between various emotions (Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, 
Poehlmann & Ito, 2000).
Although RDoC and other critics of the DSM system have rightly criticized the overreliance 
on self-report for diagnosis and assessment, subjective experience is a critical component of 
mental disorders and likely to remain so in future diagnostic manuals. For the foreseeable 
future, if a patient reports excellent emotional health, there will be no biological basis to 
refer him/her to psychotherapy. Along these lines, Franklin, Jamieson, Glenn & Nock (2015) 
and Miller (2010) observe, subjective mental phenomena (such as emotion) are not the same 
as objective physical phenomena, and by forcing this translation important information is 
lost. Kosslyn and Koenig (1992) provide the analogy of “replacing a description of 
architecture with a description of building materials. Although the nature of the materials 
restricts the kind of building that can be built, it does not characterize their function or 
design” (p. 4).” It is uncertain that an understanding of neurotransmitters and brain circuits 
alone can adequately describe the complexity of emotions.
As materialists, we and most scientists believe that psychological states are ultimately 
mediated by the brain and involve brain circuitry on some level. Biological measures are 
important and we all use them in our own research. Biological indices may constrain other 
aspects of the emotional system or identify risk factors before symptoms even arise. At the 
same time, whether biological measures of emotion should be seen as the “the first among 
equals” is an empirical question and should be decided on the basis of incremental clinical 
utility –for diagnosis or treatment decisions—for use of biological indices over other 
measures of emotion (e.g., Youngstrom & De Los Reyes, 2015). It remains to be seen 
whether the brain (or another biological system) is an optimal level of analysis to understand 
a construct like emotion that is also shaped by strong cultural and social forces that are 
exceedingly difficult to reduce to biology (see Berenbaum, 2013, Miller, 2010, for 
discussions). Our concern is that it is premature to assume biological measures are primary 
(and causally occur first), and that this holding this assumption might close off other 
important lines of work to understand emotion in all its complexity.
Challenge 2: How do we integrate measures of emotion with other systems in a wider 
context?
Apart from the difficulty of integrating biological measures of emotion across multiple 
systems (e.g., subjective experience, behavior, physiology, neural measures), there is the 
challenge of integrating emotion in the larger systems in which it is embedded, such as 
social, cultural, and developmental frameworks. Developmental processes and 
environmental factors are a component of RDoC but they are not a major focus of the 
framework, which is seeking relatively invariant markers of psychopathology.
Franklin et al. (2013) proposed that developmental psychopathology frameworks could 
inform the challenge of the RDoC endeavor to integrate across multiple systems. 
Developmental frameworks do not give the primacy to biological measures that RDoC does 
(Cicchetti, 1993; Rutter & Stroufe, 2000), but instead focuses on interactions between 
biological measures (including psychophysiology) and the environment, such as adverse life 
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events, and emphasizes moderators of these pathways and changes across the lifespan 
(Franklin, et al., 2013). Indeed, examination of cross-level interactions in multiple systems 
may be critically important to gain a true understanding of causal mechanisms underlying 
psychopathology (e.g., Kendler, 2014).
A key point is that biological markers of emotion dysregulation are not invariant. Whether a 
biological pattern reflects a specific aspect of emotion dysregulation may change both across 
the lifespan and across the development of a disorder (i.e., from a period of vulnerability to 
first onset of a disorder to remission and recurrence of a disorder). It is clear that the 
transactional nature of the relationship among variables is complex and various risk factors 
do not confer uniform risk for all individuals in the same way or the same over time across 
the lifespan (Cicchetti, 1993; Rutter & Stroufe, 2000; Beauchaine, Gatzke-Kopp, & Mead, 
2007).
The existence of these moderating factors may partly explain why the literature on emotional 
reactivity and regulation is often quite mixed and inconsistent, such as findings on RSA in 
depression (Bylsma, Salomon, Taylor-Clift, Morris & Rottenberg, 2014). This underscores 
the need for future work on biological markers of emotion to incorporate developmental, 
environmental, and/or contextual factors. For example, there is growing evidence that 
context impacts whether or not an emotion regulation strategy is adaptive or maladaptive 
(Aldao, 2013; Troy, Shallcross & Mauss, 2013).
In sum, even if we could find an excellent set of physiological measures indexing some 
emotional process, we still must consider how that relationship might change with context or 
developmental stage. While not a current emphasis of RDoC, it is clear that developmental 
processes and environmental factors are also critical in integrating across multiple units of 
analysis and understanding emotional process as they relate to psychopathology.
Challenge 3: What do physiological indices of emotion tell us about clinical phenomena?
Given this pair of challenges from basic research, it not surprising that when we survey the 
data we see that biological measures of emotion exhibit only a probabilistic relationship to 
symptoms of psychopathology. Take, for example, the finding of low RSA levels in 
depression. Meta-analytic evidence provides support for a modest negative association 
between levels of RSA and depression (Rottenberg, 2007). The modest effect size leads to 
the expectation that individual research studies will often not find an effect. In line with this 
expectation, the Kircanski et al. paper from this special section that did not find any baseline 
RSA differences in MDD versus controls. The articles in this special section, in many ways, 
reflect the state of the art of the field in which designs are mostly correlational, and research 
findings show the presence of a modest association between a physiological measure and a 
clinical phenomenon. Relatedly, it remains unclear what the prediction accuracies are for the 
measures of emotion dysfunction that are available. For example, although we can say 
individuals with MDD are more likely to exhibit low RSA or blunted RSA reactivity, there is 
no established clinical threshold or established prediction accuracy for how well we can 
predict someone might have depression now or in the future based on these physiological 
values (e.g., at what values does RSA level or reactivity become pathological?). In these 
respects, at this stage of knowledge, we are asking clinicians and treatment researchers to 
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take something of a leap of faith to use physiological measures that have only a modest 
association with other measures of emotion or clinical outcomes.
The modest relationships among measures and symptoms call attention to the need for better 
norms in physiological measures, so that they can be more portable to a clinical 
environment. As Aldao and De Los Reyes (2015) note, it can be unclear how physiological 
indicators relate to clinically relevant information due to lack of adequate normative 
comparisons. For example, for any given laboratory task and psychophysiological measure 
of emotional reactivity or regulation, we lack clear normative data for normal healthy 
populations (complicating interpretation context of psychopathology). While the range 
normative levels of physiological variables is for resting baselines, we lack established 
norms for appropriate physiological reactivity to many if not most of the paradigms used in 
emotion research.
One critical problem is neglect of measurement error in laboratory studies that measure 
emotion and similar phenomena (see Berenbaum, 2013, for further discussion). As this 
point, self-report or behavioral measures of behavior, cognition, or emotion are often 
superior predictors of psychiatric problems than biological measures (e.g., Haeffel et al., 
2008; Kwapil, 1998; Lilenfield, 2014). A next step for research that justifies the 
incorporation of these measures into clinical assessments would be to show that 
aphysiological measure has incremental validity over another existing indicator of disorder, 
of course, of response to treatment, etc.
Part of this issue can be addressed by improving measurement error in our laboratory 
psychophysiological studies. For example, laboratory measures often have low temporal and 
cross-situational consistency and are easily influenced by slight changes in the 
environmental context or state variables (Epstein, 1979, 1980). This could be particularly 
relevant for emotion regulation, where there is evidence that its effectiveness and 
associations with outcomes depend upon the context (Aldao, 2013; Troy et al., 2013). It 
would benefit laboratory studies to obtain more data on test-retest reliability of 
psychophysiological measures of emotion, conduct more replication studies across a variety 
of large samples (both healthy and disordered), and systematically examine relevant 
contextual factors. Ambulatory physiological assessments in daily life may also be useful to 
address contextual factors that may be difficult to replicate in the laboratory environment.
In keeping with most prior work on biological measures of emotion in psychopathology, 
three of the four articles in this special section focus on DSM diagnostic categories. 
Consistent with the RDoC initiative, prior findings may be muddied since they are based on 
problematic DSM categories, including high levels of co-morbidities and symptom 
heterogeneity within the diagnostic categories. Along these lines, some findings have 
suggested that disorders such as depression may instead reflect heterogeneous symptom 
clusters that overlap significantly with other related disorders (e.g., Fried, 2015; Fried & 
Nesse, 2014). Thus, in order to validate RDoC constructs using biological measures, what 
we additionally need are larger scale studies recruiting individuals with a wide range of 
symptoms and diagnostic presentations, ranging from mild to clinically impairing levels. 
Indeed, we must be cautious of focusing our search on a specific underlying mechanism for 
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a DSM-defined mental disorder when there may be multiple distinct mechanisms 
corresponding to several distinct syndromes, or where some disorders thought to be distinct 
may actually reflect the same underlying pathology (Kendler, 2014).
Challenge 4: How do we integrate physiological assessments into clinical practice?
A key focus of this special section is to integrate physiological measures into assessment and 
interventions in clinical practice. The editors rightly point out that recent advances in 
technology may help integrate physiological measures into clinical practice by reducing 
some of earlier challenges with availability, affordability and ease of use. As the articles in 
the special section highlight, physiological measures have the potential to improve clinical 
assessment and intervention, particularly if they can be utilized in an efficient, user-friendly, 
and cost-effective manner. This special section takes us one step further into making that a 
reality. Nevertheless, significant practical challenges remain before psychophysiological 
measures can be brought into widespread clinical practice.
One lingering issue is the cost of the software and specialized equipment. As mentioned 
elsewhere in this special section, free software may help alleviate resource issues. Indeed 
Kircanski et al. (this issue) used ANSLAB for their physiological processing, which is a free 
software program (Wilhelm, Grossman, & Roth, 1999). Weeks, Srivastav, Howell & Menatti 
(this issue) used expensive software, but note that it is possible to do similar analyses of 
vocal pitch using freely available software and an inexpensive voice recorder (which most 
clinicians probably have in their practice).
Although data collection has become much easier, it would also be unwise to minimize the 
expertise and time investment still required to utilize physiological measures in a reliable 
and valid way. Areas of expertise and time investment include how to troubleshoot problems 
of data acquisition, data cleaning and processing, and analysis and interpretation of the 
resulting data. Gaining such expertise is impeded by the fact that no comprehensive and 
widely accepted manuals exist, and it can take years to become technically proficient. While 
free software may be available, often free programs require even more technical skill, have 
less user-friendly features, and may provide more limited technical support, relative to the 
more expensive software programs. Weeks et al. (this issue) noted that they did not use the 
free software because they needed to ensure that the background noise was thoroughly 
removed of any artifacts. This would be a significant concern in clinical settings where it 
may be challenging to achieve all the environmental control of a typical laboratory 
environment. Would clinicians using freely available software be given the tools to ensure 
that artifacts such as electrical interference don’t contaminate data collection? None of these 
issues is insurmountable, but each could bear further thought.
Of note, problems with incorporating psychophysiological measures into the clinical setting 
may vary by the type of measure. For example, measures such as heart rate, skin 
conductance, or blood pressure may be more readily incorporated into the clinical setting, as 
these do not require as much expertise or special software to acquire and process the data. In 
contrast, measures such as pre-ejection period require greater expertise for accurate data 
collection with impedance cardiography, and the quantification of RSA hinges on high 
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sampling rates and more sophisticated algorithms than might be readily accessible in clinical 
settings.
The Dunn, Aldao & De Los Reyes article (this issue) tries to address some of these 
challenges by using Chernoff faces, a method for graphically depicting physiological arousal 
to aid in clinical decision making, which is an innovative idea that can make interpretation of 
complex physiological signals easier for clinicians. If developed, even patients may 
ultimately be able to gain insight into their own physiological responding, in some cases. It 
may be helpful for the patient to become aware of their physiological arousal and reinforce 
their success with the exposures during the course of therapy. However, even with this 
method, of course, some expertise is still needed to ensure that good signals are being 
acquired, and that the data are properly processed.
In particular, ambulatory devices are becoming more readily available, including some 
marketed to the general public for monitoring related to aspects such as exercise, fitness and 
sleep, which have necessitated making the devices cheaper and more user-friendly. Many of 
these devices are linked to “apps” on smartphones that are very easy to use. Some of these 
may be more scientifically sound than others, and further validation is needed. However, 
there is potential for similar devices and software to be developed for use in a clinical 
setting. For example, Wichers et al. (2011) reviews the potential applications of momentary 
assessment technology for depression in a clinical setting.
Another set of issues concerns the type of stimuli (e.g., emotional films, stressor tasks, 
emotion regulation tasks, etc.) that should be used in a clinical setting. An assumption might 
be that these should be the same as are used in laboratory settings. For example, the Dunn et 
al. article (this issue) uses standardized emotional film stimuli. Such film clips are a gold 
standard in laboratory studies using physiological measures of emotion reactivity because 
they are readily standardized across individuals (Rottenberg, Ray & Gross, 2007). Or, take 
the case of the Kircanski, Waugh, Camacho & Gotlib article (this issue), who used the Trier 
stress task in a sample of participants diagnosed with GAD and MDD. Again, this task is 
widely used in laboratory stress inductions (Dickerson & Kemeney, 2004). However, what 
constitutes a gold standard in the laboratory may not be the most helpful and appealing to 
the clinician and patient. For example, film and other stimuli used in the laboratory may not 
be easily accessible to a clinician and could require computers or other equipment to display. 
Further, the Trier stress task can be quite upsetting, which may make clinicians and patients 
hesitant to use this in the context of therapy when it does not have clear therapeutic value. 
Some of the laboratory tasks also require the use of confederates, which would be difficult to 
use in a therapy setting. Instead, for example, for a person with social anxiety, it could make 
the most sense to use social exposures from the person’s fear hierarchy as part of an initial 
clinical assessment, followed by additional social exposures throughout the course of 
therapy as the person works up their fear hierarchy. Or, in the case of a person with GAD, a 
worry exposure could be used. Or, for a person with MDD, the patient could be led to think 
about a current situation that is affecting their mood. In clinical settings, standardized 
laboratory stimuli are not needed, especially since good normative data are not usually 
available. Using idiosyncratic stimuli would also increase the feasibility of obtaining 
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physiological responses, since no additional time and resources would be spent on stimuli 
that aren’t relevant to the person’s treatment plan.
Another suggestion to make these tools more clinically relevant and appealing to clinicians 
is inspired by the use of Chernoff faces (Dunn et al., this issue). Perhaps instead of detecting 
facial features, it could be possible to convert the signals visually to something akin to a 
feelings thermometer, a common tool in cognitive-behavioral therapy. This could be a useful 
clinical tool in contexts such as exposure therapy for anxiety disorders. For example, as a 
patient works up the steps of his or her fear hierarchy with a therapist, a physiological 
assessment of the patient’s arousal level can complement self-report ratings. This 
information could help to inform the clinician about when the patient successfully habituates 
to each level of the fear hierarchy and is ready to move on to a higher level. The patient 
could also potentially be getting some positive reinforcement from seeing the corresponding 
changes in physiology as he or she works up the fear hierarchy.
Although the aforementioned challenges will need to be addressed before physiological 
measures can be adequately used to make diagnostic or treatment decisions, we may begin 
to use physiology to enhance assessment and treatment in the ways we highlighted above, 
provided that we don’t give undue weight to biological measures or ignore other experiential 
and behavioral measures that may be as or more important.
Summary and conclusion
This special section has drawn needed attention to the goal of integrating biological 
measures of emotion and emotion regulation into clinical practice. In this comment, we have 
highlighted the many additional steps that will need to be taken to accomplish this goal. 
RDoC is conceptualized as a dynamic long-term program of research that is a “vision for the 
future” (Insel, 2010). Our view is that we are still some time off from fully validated RDoC 
constructs that can be easily integrated into clinical practice. We, too, are excited about this 
vision, but the conceptual and practical challenges of this integration should not be 
underestimated.
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